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Abstract 
 
The payday loan industry is one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer financial 
services market in the United States. The purpose of our study is to design an environment 
similar to the one that payday loan customers face.  We then conduct a laboratory experiment to 
examine what effect, if any, the existence of payday loans has on individuals’ abilities to manage 
and to survive financial setbacks.  Our primary objective is to examine whether access to payday 
loans improves or worsens the likelihood of financial survival in our experiment.  We also test 
the degree to which people’s use of payday loans affects their ability to survive financially.  We 
find that payday loans help the subjects to absorb expenditure shocks and, therefore, survive 
financially.  However, subjects whose demand for payday loans exceeds a certain threshold level 
are at a greater risk than a corresponding subject in the treatment in which payday loans do not 
exist. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The payday loan industry is one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer 
financial services market in the United States. It sprung up in the early 1990’s 
when commercial check cashing stores began offering customers the option of 
taking out a short-term loan to help them meet unplanned expenses until their next 
payday. Payday loans are short-term loans of $100 to $500 that typically must be 
paid back within two weeks or by the borrower’s next payday. The fees for these 
loans vary from $10 to $25 per $100 borrowed. Although the loan is unsecured, 
the borrower must be employed, provide personal identification, and have a 
checking account. While some payday lenders conduct cursory credit checks 
using services provided by, for example, Teletrack, payday loans are generally 
provided without any formal credit check.  One of the appeals of these loans, as 
documented in a number of studies (see, for example, Elliehausen and Lawrence 
(2001)), is the speed with which individuals can obtain these loans.1   While 
relatively easy to obtain, payday loans are expensive when compared to the 
interest rates charged on other consumer loans. 
  
The typical payday loan customer is relatively young with a high school 
education but little or no college education. They have little money in their 
checking account and few, if any, alternative sources of credit because they are at 
(or have exceeded) their credit limit, or previously have been turned down for 
more conventional consumer loans. Payday loan customers’ most frequently cited 
reason for using the loans is to meet unplanned expenses. Rapid growth of the 
payday loan industry suggests that this industry evolved to fill a gap in the 
consumer credit market not being served by more traditional lending institutions.   
 
Two aspects of payday loans draw significant attention in the policy arena: 
(1) interest rates charged for these loans; and (2) the potential effect of these loans 
on the “cycle of debt” faced by some consumers.2  Interest rates on the majority of 
payday loans exceed 300% on an annual percentage rate (APR) basis, causing 
some to claim that payday lending is predatory.  For example, Stegman and Faris 
(2003, p. 20) note that “if repeated, chronic borrowing is as commonplace as it 
appears, then the triple-digit APRs charged by most payday lenders may go 
beyond what is fair and become abusive and predatory.”  Because of these high 
interest rates, some critics suggest that interest rate ceilings should be 
implemented or propose that the industry be banned altogether.  There is also 
                                                 
1 One of us took out a payday loan in less than 25 minutes. 
2 For a more detailed discussion of these and other criticisms of the payday loan industry, see 
www.responsiblelending.org. The Center for Responsible Lending, as stated on this website, 
serves as “a resource for predatory lending opponents.”   
 evidence suggesting that a number of consumers rely frequently on these loans 
and, therefore, potentially become caught in what critics call a “cycle of debt.”  In 
these situations, borrowers can find themselves paying fees for a loan that exceed 
the initial loan amount.  
  
Despite these and other criticisms, supporters of the industry contend that 
payday lenders are simply providing credit to individuals who otherwise would 
not be able to obtain it in the more formal financial sector.  Supporters further 
argue that the credit obtained in this industry allows individuals to weather short-
term financial disruptions caused by, for example, unexpected expenditures.  
Additionally, a comparison of the costs of payday loans with, for example, the 
costs of bounced checks indicates that payday loans may not be the most 
expensive choice individuals face.3 
 
 The objective of our study is to design an environment similar to the one 
that payday loan customers face and conduct a laboratory experiment to examine 
what effect, if any, the existence of payday loans has on individuals’ abilities to 
manage and to survive financial setbacks.   In our experiment, we control a 
number of features that allow us to examine the effect of payday loans in different 
treatments.  Each participant faces the same payday loan fee, the same distribution 
of anticipated monthly expenditures, and the same distribution of unanticipated 
shocks.  The supply of payday loans is also exogenously imposed so as to focus 
solely on the demand-side of the equation.   
 
In contrast to field studies that cannot directly measure the welfare of 
individuals, all individuals start off on the exact same footing and thus we can 
directly measure how well different sets of subjects manage their induced 
financial circumstances.  By randomly assigning participants to different 
treatment conditions, our results allow us to comment on how payday loans affect 
an individual’s ability to adjust financially to unexpected expenditures.4  Our 
analysis also allows us to comment on the extent to which individuals’ 
consumption decisions result in a demand for payday loans that potentially creates 
and/or compounds financial difficulties. 
 
                                                 
3 In the May 2005 issue of Consumer Reports, a comparison of the implicit APR on bounced 
checks, overdraft protection, and several other forms of overdraft protection were compared.  
Depending on the total cost assumed, the APR for overdraft protection ranged from 608% to 
791% and the APR for bounced check fees ranged from 487% to 730%.   
4 There is no random assignment of people to conditions with and without payday loans in field 
studies. 
  The paper is organized as follows: the next section, Section II briefly 
summarizes the literature on payday loans.  Section III describes the experimental 
design and procedures.  Then in the next section we present hypotheses and the 
semi-parametric model to evaluate them.  Section V discusses our results, and the 
final section summarizes our conclusions.5  
 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Among the earliest research, Caskey (1994) describes the features of fringe 
banking and describes those who use fringe banks to obtain financial services.6  A 
growing number of studies examine in more detail various aspects of the industry.  
Several papers focus on the determinants of the location decision of payday 
lenders (Graves (2003), Burkey and Simkins (2004), Graves and Peterson (2005), 
Prager (2009), and Damar (2009)).  The results of several of these papers are 
consistent with claims that payday lenders may fill a void created by the departure 
of more traditional lending institutions.  These results would also partly explain 
the rapid growth in the demand for payday loans.  Several other studies focus on 
the cost and revenue structure of payday lenders, on payday loan pricing behavior, 
on the profitability of payday lenders, and on payday lender and borrower 
behavior (Stegman and Faris (2003), Flannery and Samolyk (2005), Skiba and 
Tobacman (2007), DeYoung and Phillips (2009), Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman 
(2009), and Bertrand and Morse (2009a, 2009b)). The remainder of the most 
recent research on payday lending focuses on why individuals might use payday 
loans and on the effects of payday lending on a variety of economic outcomes.        
 
  The evidence concerning whether access to high interest rate loans has a 
beneficial or adverse effect on economic outcomes is mixed.  A number of studies 
have found that payday lending has a harmful effect on individuals or causes an 
increase in adverse economic outcomes (Carrell and Zinman (2008), Campbell, 
                                                 
5 Appendix A provides the instructions for the experiment.  Another appendix, available upon 
request, includes a discussion of three subjects in one of the treatments as examples of how 
payday loans aided, harmed, or could have aided subjects.  
6 Fringe banks also include, for example, check-cashing establishments and pawn shops. A 
number of recent studies provide additional descriptive analyses of the growth of payday lending, 
the characteristics of payday borrowers, and public policy issues related to the industry (Fox 
(1999/2000), Caskey (2001, 2002, and 2005), Stegman (2001), Barr (2004), Bair (2005), Pyper 
(2007), Stegman (2007), and Lawrence and Elliehausen (2008)).  While Chin (2004), Chessin 
(2005), Butler and Park (2005), Mann and Hawkins (2007), and Huckstep (2007) also include 
descriptions of payday lending and further document its growth, these studies focus more on the 
legal and regulatory aspects of the industry. Skiba and Tobacman (2008) offer several theoretical 
explanations (e.g., high discount rates) for why individuals use high interest rate loans and 
conclude (p. 16) that “the naïve and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic models perform better than the 
exponential model at explaining payday borrowing, repayment, and default.” 
 Martinez Jerez, and Tufano (2008), Melzer (2009), Melzer and Morgan (2009), 
Skiba and Tobacman (2009).  At the same time, several other studies find that 
access to higher interest rate loans and payday loans in particular have a 
beneficial effect or cause a reduction in adverse economic outcomes (Morgan 
(2007), Morgan and Strain (2008), Morse (2009), Karlan (2010), and Karlan and 
Zinman (2010)).  
 
The results of two studies on the effect of payday loans on personal 
bankruptcy are also mixed. Skiba and Tobacman (2009) find that payday loans 
increase the incidence of personal bankruptcy, while Lefgren and McIntyre 
(2009) find that the existence of payday loans has no effect on bankruptcy rates. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to examine the extent to which the 
existence and use of payday loans affect an individual’s ability to manage and 
survive financial setbacks with uncertain and unforeseeable expenditures and a 
certain fixed income.7  We consider two economic treatments: the Loan (L) 
treatment, in which payday loans are a financing option; and (2) the No Loan (NL) 
treatment, in which payday loans do not exist.   This second treatment is 
motivated by our interest in examining whether the existence of payday loans 
alters subject welfare.  Given that we did not know ex ante the extent to which 
subjects would put themselves into financially tight circumstances, we conducted 
our first sessions with a liberal maximum number of overdraft checks, eight.  This 
maximum kicked in after the first experimental month in a session of 30 months, 
so as to not penalize the subjects too harshly for poor decisions in their first 
month.  After observing 45 subjects in this treatment, we then introduced a 
treatment that could increase the demand for payday loans by reducing the 
availability of the alternative, namely we limited each subject to a maximum of 
two instead of eight overdraft checks after the first month.     
 
 An additional treatment variable is whether or not each participant loses 
utility from writing a check when there are insufficient funds in the participant’s 
account.  In the Overdraft Protection treatment, the participant is charged a fee 
and, implicitly, the bank covers the check so that the participant does not incur 
any negative consequences from the payee for writing a check with insufficient 
funds in her account.  In this paper, we refer to these types of checks as 
overdrafts.  111 participants faced this treatment condition, 54 without access to 
                                                 
7 See Smith (1994) for an excellent discussion of using experimental economics to evaluate policy 
prescriptions in general and Wilson (2007) for a discussion on the use of experimental economics 
to examine issues in antitrust.   
 loans and 57 with access to loans.  We subsequently conducted a harsher 
treatment, the No Overdraft Protection treatment, which penalizes participants 
who “bounce checks” on bills.  The penalty, however, is delayed until the next 
month as it takes time for the check to fail to clear.8  In the treatment without 
overdraft protection, we refer to checks written without sufficient funds and, 
therefore, checks that incur both a fee and a subsequent penalty as bounced 
checks.  162 participants faced this treatment, half without access to payday loans 
and half with access to payday loans.  The 23 design is summarized in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
(Number of Subjects) 
 
                 Overdraft Protection Treatment 
 
 No Loan Loan  Total 
8 Overdrafts  NL8 (23) 
L8 
(22) 45 
2 Overdrafts NL2 (54) 
L2 
(57) 111 
Total 77 79 156 
 
                 No Overdraft Protection Treatment 
 
 No Loan Loan  Total 
8 Bounced Checks  NL8 (41) 
L8 
(41) 82 
2 Bounced Checks  NL2 (40) 
L2 
(40) 80 
Total 81 81 162 
 
 Each subject earns cash based on a series of financial and consumption 
decisions over thirty 28-day months, or 840 periods.  Each day lasts four seconds.  
Participants are seated at visually-isolated carrels, with each subject using a 
computer to access information, such as the instructions (see Appendix A) and 
their financial situation (e.g., historical payments, current balance, bills due), and 
to enter their decisions (e.g., which bills to pay).  Subjects earn US dollars by 
consuming goods for which they have bills to pay in experimental dollars.  Each 
bill appears 28 days before it is due. When a bill appears, a subject receives 
“consumption points”, or “utility” in the vernacular of economics, for a good or 
service.  Each consumption point equals one US cent in earnings for the subject.   
                                                 
8 The penalties associated with bouncing a check represent any costs imposed on individuals by 
merchants.  In addition to charging individuals for bounced checks, merchants may post the 
individual’s name and/or refuse to conduct business with that individual in the future.   
 Failure to pay bills on time leads to penalties in the form of deductions from a 
subject’s accumulated consumption points. 
 
 Each subject is endowed with a starting balance of 50 experimental dollars 
(E$) and collects biweekly paychecks of 475 experimental dollars.  The final 
balance of experimental dollars is converted into US dollars at the rate of E$400 = 
US$1.   For ease of discussion, $ will denote experimental dollars, except for any 
reference to actual payouts of cash to the subjects at the end of each session.  
 
 We chose bill and income parameters to place subjects in tight financial 
situations so that failure to survive financially results in the termination of the 
ability to earn money during the session.  Each month a subject must accrue a 
minimum of 100 consumption points.  If a subject fails to meet the monthly 
minimum of 100, the subject may no longer participate in the session.  We chose 
this monthly minimum to induce a reason for the subjects to pay bills.  We also 
chose it to create an incentive for subjects to continue to participate in the 
experiment to increase their earnings.  This minimum threshold, therefore, 
conveniently serves as the primary means for us to measure how loans affect the 
ability of subjects to extend their participation and, as we discuss later, to survive 
financially. 
 
A bar graph at the bottom portion of the screen continuously updates the 
number of consumption points that a subject has accumulated in a month (see 
Figure 1 for a screenshot for a subject in the Loan treatment).  Once a subject is 
eliminated, he or she can no longer make decisions or earn money in the 
remaining periods.  However, in an effort to not disrupt those subjects who 
continue to participate, these subjects remain at their computer terminals until all 
subjects in the laboratory complete the session.   Eliminated subjects may surf the 
Internet or participate in a quiet activity, such as reading, without leaving their 
carrel. 
  
The series of monthly bills faced by each subject is given in Table 2.   
Over time, subjects become familiar with these basic monthly bills, as they appear 
each month 28 days before their due date.  As mentioned in the introduction, 
meeting unplanned expenses is the most frequently cited reason for why payday 
loan customers’ take out payday loans.  To capture this feature in the experiment 
we implemented large bill shocks that yield no consumption points but carry hefty 
penalties if they are not paid.  These additional bills are more irregular and 
infrequent, and are not known to the subjects until the bills appear on each 
subject’s computer screen 28 days before they are due.  Table 3 lists these bill 
shocks.   
  
 
 
Table 2. Monthly Bills 
 
Day Description Amount Days until 
due 
Consumption 
Points 
Penalty 
2 Rent 304 28 38 38 
3 Cell Phone 48 28 6 5 
6 Utilities 88 28 11 11 
11 Groceries 120 28 15 15 
16 Cable/Internet 96 28 12 6 
17 Insurance 112 28 14 7 
21 Credit Card 80 28 10 10 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot for Subject in the Loan Treatment 
 
*N.B. The only difference for subjects in the No Loan treatment is that they did not have the loan frame in the bottom 
right corner.  The consumption point counter in the bottom middle portion of the screen turned from red to green 
when the subject met the minimum threshold of 100 consumption points to continue on to the next month. 
  
Table 3. Other Unexpected Bills (or Shocks) 
 
Month/Day Description Amount Days until 
due 
Consumption 
Points 
Penalty 
4/7 and 21/7 Vet Visit 180 28 0 45 
10/7 and 26/7 Dentist Appointment 190 28 0 48 
15/7 Car Repair 200 28 0 50 
18/7 Taxes 212 28 0 53 
23/7 Appliance Repair 148 28 0 37 
24/7 Car Repair 152 28 0 38 
26/7 Driving Violation 200 28 0 50 
 
 
 An individual decides which bills to pay and when to pay them.  The total 
amount of bills to be paid over the course of the experiment is $26,244 and the 
total amount of income (plus the starting balance) is $28,075.9  Thus bills 
comprise 93.5% of a subject’s income, leaving just 6.5% for discretionary 
spending.  As presented in Table 4, subjects also can choose to purchase optional 
consumption items at a take-it-or-leave-it price when they become available.  
Subjects are not informed of the frequency or type of consumption items offered 
in advance.   Purchase of consumption items provide consumption points, which 
accrue to each subject’s earnings.  If a (frugal) subject refrains from buying any 
optional consumption items (and pays all bills on time), he or she will survive 
until the end of the experiment without taking out a payday loan, bouncing a 
check, or relying on overdraft protection.   
 
Payment for consumption items is due at the time of purchase. Notice that 
optional consumption items generate consumption points at twice the rate that 
bills do. This is meant to capture the more hedonistic pleasure of leisure activities 
relative to the mundane consumption of utilities, for example.  We assume that a 
vendor has no recourse if a participant bounces a check on an optional 
consumption item. However, the treatment conditions limit the total number of 
bounced checks (or overdrafts) to two or eight, so that bouncing checks (or 
writing overdrafts) eventually catches up with a participant. 
 
 Bounced checks or overdrafts are permitted in all of the experimental 
sessions, though as described at the onset of this section, the maximum number 
permitted varies with the treatment.  Each bounced check or overdraft leads to a 
                                                 
9 Since the experiment ends after 30 experimental months, this calculation omits the last paycheck 
on day 28 of month 30 which could not be used to pay bills, nor the last month’s set of bills to 
appear which would come due the following month. 
 fee of $35, regardless of the amount of the check.  When a participant bounces a 
check on a bill in the No Overdraft Protection treatment, he avoids the 
consumption point penalty in the current month, but this is only temporary as the 
penalty then hits the participant on day 23 of the following month.  The bill also 
remains unpaid.  The Overdraft Protection treatment differs in that the participant 
avoids the consumption point penalty in the next month.  The bill, however, 
remains unpaid and the participant is still assessed the $35 fee for the overdraft.10   
 
Table 4. Consumption Item Purchase Opportunities 
 
Month/Day 
Introduced 
Frequency Item is 
Offered 
Description Price Consumption Points 
1/7 Monthly Movie 24 6 
1/17 Monthly Club 32 8 
2/22 Monthly Hobby 28 7 
3/19 Monthly Concert 36 9 
5/9 Bi-Monthly Sporting Event 80 20 
6/2 Tri-Monthly Vacation 200 50 
 
 
 All unpaid bills for the month appear as a lump sum item, “Previous 
Unpaid Bills”, on the first day of the following month and are due 28 days later.  
If a participant fails to pay the previously unpaid bills, he or she incurs the 
associated consumption point penalty (in the case of utilities, 11 points) and the 
amount is rolled over to the next month until it is paid.   
  
The computer serves as the payday loan lender in this experiment.  The 
payday loans offered in this experiment are always $200 at a fee of $35, which is 
typical of the rate found in naturally occurring markets.  No subject may take out 
a loan more than twice ($470) per biweekly pay period (recall the $475 
paycheck).  Note that the fee for bouncing a check or writing an overdraft is the 
same as the fee for taking out a $200 loan.  All loans automatically are repaid on 
the next payday.  All sessions begin without loans available and then on day 27 in 
month 2, the subjects in the Loan treatment receive the additional instructions on 
the availability of loans and how they work.  Loans always are referred to in the 
experiment as “loans” and not “payday loans.” 
  
A total of 318 subjects participated in the experiment conducted at a large 
state university in the spring and fall of 2006 and the spring of 2007.  Subjects 
were undergraduate students recruited from the university at large, many from a 
                                                 
10 In the Overdraft Protection treatment, the “unpaid” bill represents the sum the individual must 
implicitly pay the bank which has “covered” the check.   
 table in front of a cafeteria.  Participants received $7.00 for showing up on time 
and additional earnings from the experiment itself.  Table 5 reports the summary 
statistics on the subject earnings by treatment. 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics on Earnings in US$* 
 
Overdraft Protection 
 L2 NL2 L8 NL8 
Mean 23.59 23.40 20.99 20.58 
Median 26.09 24.32 17.94 16.27 
Minimum 3.05 2.29 2.69 3.24 
Maximum 37.57 37.48 37.30 37.47 
 
No Overdraft Protection 
 L2 NL2 L8 NL8 
Mean 7.38 13.48 17.78 17.71 
Median 11.13 6.86 16.61 17.16 
Minimum 3.01 2.87 2.86 2.75 
Maximum 37.57 37.57 36.74 36.93 
 
    * Does not  include $7.00 show-up payment. 
 
Each subject was seated at a computer terminal and privately read the self-
paced instructions on the screen. The experiment began after every subject had 
completed reading the instructions.  Each session typically lasted approximately 
75 minutes and no subject participated in more than one session (though several 
attempted to do so).  The subjects were told that the experiment would not last 
longer than 90 minutes and so ended well in advance of this limit even if they 
survived until month 30. Earnings were paid privately at the conclusion of the 
experiment. 
 
 Before discussing the results we briefly comment on what we can learn 
about payday loans in the laboratory vis-à-vis the field.  A natural question might 
be, how can we compare the consumption in the experiment with the consumption 
in the naturally occurring economy?   The answer to this question lies not in 
explaining how the benefit of paying a grocery bill in our one hour computer 
exercise somehow corresponds to the benefit of supermarket purchases by a 30-
year old single mother of two in rural Virginia.   Our aim is to observe what 
groups of cash-motivated participants do and do not do when faced with a focused 
task; and here’s the key, when replicated under a common set of initial conditions.  
The typical consumer of payday loans is scraping by month to month and lives in 
a world full of financial shocks whose frequency and magnitude cannot be 
 anticipated.  The policy question that is debated is whether payday loans help or 
hinder these people scrape by.  To this end we designed a novel computer 
exercise in which each subject must also scrape by from period to period to 
continue earning money.11  The objectives of the single mother of two and our 
typical undergraduate participant are clearly different, but how they go about 
satisfying their objectives involves analogous trade-offs.  Both can indulge in or 
forego optional consumption purchases when they are affordable, and both can or 
cannot take out loans to finance optional purchases when they are not affordable. 
   
The most important feature of our design is that, despite their meager 
means, our subjects are strongly induced to strive to participate further in the 
experiment in much the same way that a single mother of two in Virginia strives 
to make ends meet as a basis for further striving.  Furthermore, no data, that we 
are aware of, has been collected on the number of payday customers that make 
good decisions with payday loans.  One benefit of experimental economics is that 
in the laboratory, the counterfactual, which is unseen in the naturally occurring 
economy, comes to light.  While field data sets may reflect the circumstances of 
actual payday loan customers, they cannot control for the circumstances under 
which these customers may need to use them. Nor can they randomly assign 
people to conditions with and without access to payday loans to assess the 
efficacy of payday loans. In sum, a laboratory experiment complements field 
studies with actual payday loan customers by providing data on what cannot be 
studied in the field. 
 
IV.  HYPOTHESES 
Our primary objective is to examine whether access to payday loans influences 
individual welfare and, more specifically, the likelihood of financial survival in 
our experiment.  There are other measures of welfare on which to assess the 
impact of payday loans in the naturally occurring economy, but the key feature of 
our design is the necessity of surviving month to month to earn more money in 
the experiment.  By design participants must earn $1 by making ends meet to 
continue on in the experiment.  Hence, the likelihood of survival is the most 
important determinant of a subject’s earnings.  All other measures are secondary 
to this primary determinant of participant earnings. 
 
To examine what effect the existence and use of payday loans have on the 
likelihood of financial survival, we employ the popular proportional hazards 
                                                 
11 To our knowledge this is the first economic experiment in the laboratory to employ an 
endogenous survival mechanism.   
 model developed by Cox (1972).12 In the presence of right censoring, this method 
of analyzing the effect of covariates on the hazard rate assumes 
that )()( 0xβ i ii tet λλ ′= , where λ  is the hazard function for individual i at time t, x is 
the covariate vector associated with the parameter vector β, and 0λ  is the baseline 
hazard.  For a treatment dummy variable, the Cox model affords a simple 
interpretation of the “relative risk” for our No Loan treatment.  Subjects in the No 
Loan treatment are NLeβ times less likely to survive financially than those in the 
Loan treatment.  In other words, we have a measure of the difference in 
survivability between those who do and those who do not have access to payday 
loans.  For continuous covariates, the exponentiated estimated coefficients are 
interpreted as the effect of a unit change in the covariate on the relative hazard.  
For example, 1ˆβe implies that a one-unit increase in the first covariate changes the 
hazard by ( 1βˆe – 1) × 100 percent.  An attractive feature of the semi-parametric 
Cox regression is that it makes no assumption about the parametric distribution of 
the length of financial survival.  
 
Specifically, we include a number of covariates in our Cox regression.  
The first covariate, CIPercent, measures the expenditures on optional 
consumption items as a percentage of total income.13  NumberLoans equals the 
number of loans that subject i took out in the Loan treatment.14  EarlyPenalties 
measures the number of consumption point penalties that the subject incurred in 
the first two months.  We also include several dummy variables as covariates.   
No Loan equals 1 if the subject is in the No Loan treatment, and equals zero if the 
subject is in the Loan treatment.  2BC equals 1 if the subject is in either of the 
                                                 
12 Kiefer (1988) presents a thorough introduction to the analysis of duration data and subsequent 
use of hazard models in economics.  For a less formal discussion of duration models, see Kennedy 
(2003). 
13 Because the set of opportunities for optional consumption items is fixed over a six month cycle 
and is the same cycle for every subject, the danger is minimal that the length of financial survival 
affects the covariate CIPercent, which is measured as a percentage over all months of survival. 
14 If the duration of financial survival definitionally (or involuntarily) determined the 
NumberofLoans that a subject would take out, then we would have the problem of an endogenous 
covariate and hence a biased interpretation of the hazard ratio for this covariate.  For example, a 
Cox model to assess whether casualties affect the duration of war has the endogeneity problem 
that war duration also causes deaths.  Each subject in our experiment, however, has a choice of 
whether or not to put themselves into a position to need a payday loan at any time during the 
experiment: early, middle, or late.  In other words, NumberofLoans is independent of time. Just 
because a subject survives longer doesn’t mean that the subject is going to put, or not put, him- or 
herself into a financially precarious position of needing to take out a loan.  A scatterplot of 
NumberofLoans against months of survival reveals no uniform relationship across our subjects, 
and a simple OLS regression of NumberofLoans on months of survival (for all the subjects in the 
Loan treatment) confirms this with an R2 of 0.01 and a F1,158 = 1.95 (p-value of 0.1649).    
 maximum of two bounced checks or maximum of two overdraft checks 
treatments.  2BC, therefore, equals zero if the subject is in a treatment that allows 
her to bounce up to eight checks or write up to eight overdraft checks.  
NoOverdraft equals 1 if the subject is in the No Overdraft Protection treatment, 
and equals zero if the subject is in the Overdraft Protection treatment.  And 
finally, Female equals 1 if the subject’s gender matches the variable’s name. 
 
Our hypotheses are as follows.  Our primary hypothesis is that the No 
Loan treatment decreases the likelihood of financial survival because those 
subjects do not have access to the loans to absorb the bill shocks (β1 > 0).  Critics 
of payday loans contend that people subjects may be caught in a “cycle of debt.”  
Thus, an increase in the NumberLoans variable is hypothesized to decrease the 
likelihood of financial survival.  Similarly, an increase in the use of loans results 
in more expenditures on loan fees and, therefore, results in fewer funds available 
to pay for expected bills and unexpected shocks.  Both of these interpretations 
suggest that increases in the number of loans will reduce the likelihood of 
financial survival (β4 > 0).     
  
We also expect that those subjects who can bounce no more than two 
checks or write no more than two overdrafts are less likely to survive financially.  
2BC, therefore, decreases the likelihood of financial survival because the subjects 
have fewer opportunities to use bounced checks or overdrafts as a means to 
absorb bill shocks (β2 > 0).  We also expect that NoOverdraft will decrease the 
likelihood of financial survival because, all else fixed, subjects incur additional 
penalties when bouncing checks (in comparison to overdrafts).  We hypothesize 
that the additional penalties in the No Overdraft Protection treatment will make it 
more difficult to survive (β3 > 0).   
 
We also hypothesis that increases in the CIPercent variable will decrease 
the likelihood of financial survival, as purchasing optional consumption items 
results in fewer funds available to pay for expected bills and unexpected shocks as 
they arise (β5 > 0).   Further, an increase in the EarlyPenalties variable is 
expected to decrease the likelihood of financial survival as it difficult to continue 
in the experiment if one incurs penalties early in the experiment.15  And finally, 
we have no reason to predict a gender effect in this experiment. 
  
                                                 
15 Because EarlyPenalties measures the number of penalties only in the first two months and a 
subject cannot die until the end of the second month, months of survival cannot affect 
EarlyPenalties. Hence, EarlyPenalties is not an endogenous covariate. 
 Before proceeding further we note that in analyzing the data we found a 
software bug that differentiated the environmental conditions of a small subset of 
the subjects (11%) from the others in the Overdraft Protection treatment only.  
Specifically, if a subject attempted to repay his or her “Previous Unpaid Bills” 
exactly on the first of the month, the software recorded the payment in the 
accounting ledger of the subject, but this line item for “Previous Unpaid Bills” 
would appear again in the next month to be repaid a second time.  Thus, to 
survive these subjects would have to pay their unpaid bills twice, making their 
financial survival that much more difficult.16  This software problem affected four 
subjects in the NL8 treatment, seven in the L8 treatment, twelve in the NL2 
treatment, and thirteen in the L2 treatment.  Fortunately, we can include these 
subjects in the Cox regression as “alive” or surviving for the month before the 
software bug affected them.  That is, in the month prior to the problem they are in 
exactly the same circumstances as all the other subjects in the experiment with the 
observation that they are still surviving in the experiment.17 
 
V.  RESULTS 
 
The estimates from the Cox regression are reported in Table 6. We report the 
results of the three primary treatment conditions in two model specifications, with 
and without the behavioral variables and gender.  The estimated hazard ratio for 
the No Loan treatment is 1.31 and is statistically different from one (p-value = 
0.0550) in the full model.  The estimate in the treatment dummy only model is 
1.24 (p-value = 0.0650).  The interpretation of this estimate is that the No Loan 
treatment increases the relative hazard of financial survival in our experiment by 
31 percent.  After controlling for the expenditures on the optional consumption 
items, the subjects without access to loans are at a nontrivially higher risk. Hence 
we find that the existence of payday loans, all else fixed, increases the probability 
of financial survival by 31%.  In the specification that only includes the treatment 
dummy variables, the probability of financial survival by 24%.  Payday loans, 
                                                 
16 Amazingly some subjects did. 
17 Medical studies that utilize this model often have many subjects coded similarly.  The Cox 
survival model explains how long a subject survived since a treatment condition began and takes 
as an input whether or not the subject is currently alive at the time of monitoring.  In a cross 
section of individuals it is not necessary that the individuals all have the same opportunity to 
survive, which in our case is 30 months, nor furthermore does the model assume that all subjects 
must have enough time to expire (in medical studies this means actually dying) for there to be 
useful information for the proportional hazard. Thus, if we “monitor” the subjects before the 
software bugs hits, they are coded as alive up until this point.  We cannot simply drop these 
subjects without introducing a bias into results as there may be a latent variable that selects these 
individuals to pay their bills on the first day of the month.   
 therefore, are a means for the subjects to absorb shocks when, for example, they 
do not sufficiently save for the unexpected “rainy days”. 
 
 Taking out the loans, however, does not come without its risk.  The 
estimated coefficient for the NumberLoans variable indicates that each additional 
loan increases the relative hazard by 3 percent and is highly statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.0090).18  Thus, we find that a sparing use of loans 
enhances the survivability of the subject relative to the No Loan treatment.  The 
model predicts that a subject taking out ten or fewer loans in the Loan treatment 
has a lower hazard rate than a corresponding subject in the No Loan.  However, 
taking out more than ten loans puts the subjects at a greater risk than a 
corresponding subject in the No Loan treatment.   
 
Table 6. Estimates of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Months Survived 
 
  
jβˆ  je βˆ   z-stat  p-value  jβˆ  je βˆ   z-stat  p-value 
No Loan 0.2137 1.24 1.516 0.0650  0.2666 1.31 1.58 0.0550 
2BC 0.0689 1.07 0.468 0.3200  0.2315 1.26 1.55 0.0600 
NoOverdraft 0.9343 2.55 6.086 <0.0001  0.3974 1.49 2.37 0.0090 
NumberLoans      0.0249 1.03 2.37 0.0090 
CIPercent      0.1017 1.11 4.41 <0.0001 
EarlyPenalties      0.0844 1.09 14.05 <0.0001 
Female      0.0849 1.09 0.58 0.5600 
  LR(3) = 42.8 <0.0001   LR(7) = 230 <0.0001 
  318 Obs.    318 Obs.  
 
 
The interpretation of the No Loan and NumberLoans variables provides us 
with an opportunity to offer some comments about what effect both the existence 
and use of payday loans has on the subjects’ abilities to survive financially in our 
experiment.  In our experiment, 160 subjects had access to payday loans.  Of 
those 160 subjects, 35 of them took out more than ten payday loans.  Based on the 
results of the above hazard model, the predicted probability of survival for these 
35 subjects (i.e., 21.9% of the subjects with access to payday loans) was lower 
than that for otherwise identical subjects in the No Loan treatment.  At the same 
time, the predicted probability of financial survival for the remaining 125 subjects 
for whom payday loans exist was higher than that for otherwise identical subjects 
in the No Loan treatment.  In other words, while some subjects’ financial survival 
was adversely affected by their use of payday loans, the majority of subjects in 
our experiment (i.e., 78.1% of the subjects with access to payday loans) benefited 
from both the existence of and their subsequent use of payday loans. 
                                                 
18 The additional covariates of the square of NumberLoans and an interaction variable of 
NumberLoans × CIPercent are both highly insignificant. 
 The restriction of the number of bounced checks (and overdrafts) to two 
has a significant impact on the ability of our subjects to survive financially.  
Relative to the 8BC treatment, the 2BC treatment increases the probability of 
failure by 26 percent (p-value = 0.0600). Even after taking into account the costs 
associated with bounced checks and overdrafts, this result implies that subjects’ 
abilities to survive financially are greater when the subjects are allowed to bounce 
more checks or to write more overdraft checks. This result, however, is not robust 
to the different models. In the streamlined model, 2BC is not statistically different 
from 1 (p-value = 0.3200). 
 
As hypothesized, the estimated coefficient for the NoOverdraft variable is 
positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.0090) in the full model.  This 
result indicates that those subjects in the NoOverdraft treatment are 49% less 
likely to survive financially.  Without the behavioral variables, the NoOverdraft 
variable has an extremely large impact ( 3βˆe = 2.55, p-value < 0.0001). 
 
We also find that an increase in the CIPercent variable increases the 
probability of financial failure.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in 
the share of income used to purchase optional consumption items will increase the 
probability of financial failure by 11% (p-value < 0.0001).  Figures 2 and 3 plot 
the expenditures on optional consumption items as a percentage of income against 
the number of months of financial survival and reveals a rather clear linear 
relationship between the two variables for subjects when the CIPercent is greater 
than 6.5% in the 2BC treatment.19  This figure clearly shows that the frugal 
participants who spend less than 6.5% of their income on optional items generally 
survive until the end of the experiment; the exceptions are the subjects that make 
early mistakes by failing to pay a bill associated with a large penalty.20 
Furthermore, the more that subjects spend on optional items beyond 6.5% the 
fewer months they survive.   
 
The estimated coefficient for the EarlyPenalties variable is also positive 
and statistically significant (p-value < 0.0001).  As expected, increases in the 
number of penalty points in the first two experimental months cause an increase 
in the probability of financial failure.  Specifically, each additional penalty point 
                                                 
19 Recall that monthly bills and other shocks represent 93.5% of the subjects’ income.  The 
subjects, therefore, can use 6.5% of their income for optional/discretionary spending (or saving). 
20 For example, often if a subject fails to pay the rent bill early in the experiment, there is little that 
a subject can do in the early months to overcome its associated penalty.   
 causes the probability of financial failure to increase by 9%.21   And finally, we 
find that gender has no effect (p-value = 0.5600). 
 
 
We conclude this section with observations on the spontaneous order 
plotted in Figures 2 and 3.  Notice how uniformly people survive until the end of 
the experiment (once they make it past the first 5 months), if they restrain their 
purchases of optional consumption items to less than 6.5% of income.  Recall that 
by design a solvent subject can only spend 6.5% of income on discretionary 
spending over a full 30 months of the experiment.  For subjects who more 
liberally spend their income on the optional consumption items, there is a near 
linear inverse relationship between the months survived and the percentage of 
                                                 
21 One possible explanation for this result is that the EarlyPenalties variable may capture the 
effects of the financial skills that each subject brings with her/him to the experiment.  We would 
expect that subjects who know how to pay bills, manage their financial situation, … etc. are less 
likely to incur penalties early on in the experiment.  Hence, the EarlyPenalties variable may also 
serve as proxy for personal finance skills.  Regardless of the interpretation, increases in this 
variable have a negative effect on the probability of financial survival.  
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Figure 2. CIPercent Plotted Against Months of Financial Survival for No Overdraft Treatment 
 income used to purchase optional consumption items.  Considering that people 
whose CIPercent < 6.5% take out very few loans, the above analysis indicates 
that loans are an effective tool to allow people with CIPercent > 6.5% to survive 
longer, as long as they do not overuse them.   
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The payday loan industry has received intense scrutiny by policy makers and 
consumer advocacy groups.  This is not a surprising development given the 
industry’s growth, the high interest rates charged on payday loans, and the much-
publicized news accounts of those individuals whose repeated renewals of just 
one payday loan resulted in finance charges that far exceed the initial loan.  Given 
both these high interest rates and allegations of excessive borrowing by some 
payday loan customers, a number of critics conclude that the payday loan industry 
represents abusive if not predatory lending.  Not surprisingly, some of these same 
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Figure 3. CIPercent Plotted Against Months of Financial Survival for the Overdraft Treatment 
 critics have suggested interest rate caps as a remedy while others have argued that 
the industry should be banned altogether.   
 
 In this paper, we design an environment similar to the one that payday 
loan customers face.  We then conduct a laboratory experiment to examine what 
effect, if any, the existence of payday loans has on individuals’ abilities to 
manage and to survive financial setbacks (as represented by unexpected 
expenditures).  Our primary finding addresses the question as to whether access to 
payday loans improves or worsens the likelihood of financial survival in our 
experiment.  We also test the degree to which people’s use of payday loans affects 
their ability to survive financially.  We find that payday loans are a means for the 
subjects to absorb expenditure shocks and, therefore, survive financially.  Taking 
out payday loans, however, does not come without its own risks.  Subjects whose 
demand for payday loans exceeds a certain threshold level are at a greater risk 
than a corresponding subject in the treatment in which payday loans do not exist.  
While some subjects’ financial survival was adversely affected by their use of 
payday loans, we found that the majority of subjects in our experiment benefited 
from the existence of and their subsequent use of payday loans. 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
<page 1> 
Welcome 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making.  The instructions are 
simple.  If you read them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a 
 considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
From this point on, all references are in terms of computer dollars.  In this 
experiment you will have a series of bills you must pay over the course of some 
days and months.  Some bills will come on a monthly basis and some will be one 
time only. 
 
Bills are located in the upper left portion of the screen and will appear throughout 
the experiment.  Each bill will be due in some number of days after it appears.  
This means it must be paid on or before the due date.  To pay a bill, highlight it by 
clicking on it and press the Pay Selected Bill button. 
 
Each bill will have an amount due.  Your account balance is located in the 
“Account History” frame in the bottom left portion of your screen.  This section 
of your screen records a history of your transactions and your current balance. 
 
<page 2> 
Consumption Points   
When a bill appears you will earn consumption points.  You can think of 
consumption points as the benefit you receive from consuming the item on the 
bill.  The consumption points you earn from any given bill is located under the 
“Consumption points” column in the bills frame. 
 
Every consumption point you have at the end of each month will earn you one 
cent that will paid to you at the end of the experiment.  Your monthly 
consumption point total will be reset to zero at the beginning of the month. 
 
If you do not pay a bill, you may incur a consumption point penalty.  The penalty 
for not paying a bill is located under the “Penalty” column in the Bills section.  
The penalty will be subtracted from your monthly consumption point total.  That 
bill will then appear next month as “Previous Unpaid Bills” in bill section.  You 
will continue to incur the consumption point penalty each month until you pay it 
off. 
 
<page 3> 
Consumption Points Continued 
Each month consumption items will also be available for purchase.  These items 
are located in the top right portion of your screen.   
 
 Consumption items are optional purchases; there is no penalty if you do not 
purchase them.  If you do purchase a consumption item, then the cost will be 
subtracted from your balance and the consumption points will be added to your 
monthly total. 
At the end of each month, which is every 28 days, your consumption points will 
be added to your earnings.  They will then be cleared out. 
 
Each month you must consume a minimum of 100 consumption points.  It is 
important to note that if you do not reach this minimum by the end of each month, 
your participation in the experiment will end. 
 
<page 4> 
Bills continued 
If you pay a bill that is greater than your account balance, meaning you don’t have 
enough money to pay for it, you will incur a non sufficient fund (NSF) fee.  If this 
occurs, only the NSF fee of 35 dollars will be subtracted from your balance, and 
you will avoid the consumption penalty.  However, the amount of the bill and its 
associated penalty will appear next month as part of the “Previous Unpaid Bills”.   
 
You can only incur 2 NSF fees. 
 
On the 14th and 28th of every month you will receive a paycheck in the amount of 
475.  This will be added to your account balance.   
 
<page 5> 
At the end of the experiment your balance will be converted to cash at a rate of 4 
computer dollars to one US cent.  This cash will be added to your “Earnings” 
from the consumption points, which is displayed at the bottom of your screen. 
 
Important Items for Review 
(1) Every consumption point you have at the end of a month will earn you 
one US cent. 
(2) If you do not accumulate the minimum number of consumption points by 
the end of a month, your participation in this experiment will end. 
 
If you feel you are prepared to proceed with the actual experiment, click on the 
Start button. The experiment will begin once everyone has clicked on the Start 
button.  If you have a question that you feel was not adequately answered by the 
instructions, please raise your hand and ask the monitor before proceeding.   
 
 
 <Loan treatment instructions on day 27, month 2> 
Loans  
At any time you can take out a loan from one of the x different lenders, located in 
the bottom right portion of your screen.22  All of the loans will give you the same 
amount, 200 computer dollars.  But the different lenders may offer different rates 
for their loans, located in the “Amt. Due in X Days” column.   
Suppose the rate in this column is 225, then if you took out that loan you would 
receive 200 immediately which would be available to spend.  Then you would 
owe 225 on the next payday (the 14th or the 28th ). 
 
The loan will be automatically repaid at the price the amount the lender offered at 
the time of purchase.  On the day the loan is due you can choose to renew it by 
clicking the “Renew Loan” button.  This will renew the loan at the current 
lender’s rate.  The original loan will also be automatically paid back. 
                                                 
22 The software has been programmed to implement subjects as lenders.  We chose to first 
implement a robot lender for this initial project.  Each lender has a maximum capacity of twelve 
loans, so depending upon how many subjects were in a session, we included enough computer 
lenders to accommodate two loans per subject per pay period. 
